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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA				
SAN FRANCIS	SCC	DIVISIO	N	
THEADORA KING, individually and on behalf	)	No. 08-c	v-0999-EDL	
	)		IFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION OTION TO REMAND	
	) )		FILED: January 11, 2008	
	)		•	
	)	TIME:	April 15, 2008 9:00 a.m. Courtroom E, 15th Floor	
	<u>_</u> )	2211.	Countroom 2, 12 m 1 loor	
	Shana E. Scarlett (217895) 715 Hearst Avenue, Suite 202 Berkeley, CA 94710 Telephone: (510) 725-3000 Facsimile: (510) 725-3001 shanas@hbsslaw.com  Attorneys for Plaintiff Theadora King  [Additional Counsel on Signature Page]  UNITED STATES  NORTHERN DISTRI  SAN FRANCIA	Shana E. Scarlett (217895) 715 Hearst Avenue, Suite 202 Berkeley, CA 94710 Telephone: (510) 725-3000 Facsimile: (510) 725-3001 shanas@hbsslaw.com  Attorneys for Plaintiff Theadora King  [Additional Counsel on Signature Page]  UNITED STATES DIS  NORTHERN DISTRICT  SAN FRANCISCO  THEADORA KING, individually and on behalf ) of all others similarly situated,  Plaintiff, )  v.  SAFEWAY, INC.,	Shana E. Scarlett (217895) 715 Hearst Avenue, Suite 202 Berkeley, CA 94710 Telephone: (510) 725-3000 Facsimile: (510) 725-3001 shanas@hbsslaw.com  Attorneys for Plaintiff Theadora King  [Additional Counsel on Signature Page]  UNITED STATES DISTRICT CONTRACTOR OF CALIFORM SAN FRANCISCO DIVISIO  THEADORA KING, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, on the plaintiff, of the plaintiff of the plaintiff, of the plaintiff o	

010004-16 226751 V1

## TO: ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on April 15, 2008 at 9:00 a.m., or as soon thereafter as the matter may be heard in the Courtroom of the Magistrate Judge Elizabeth D. Laporte, United States District Court, Northern District of California, San Francisco Division, Courtroom E, 15th Floor, 450 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, CA 94102, Plaintiff shall and hereby does move this Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1447 and 1453, for an order remanding this case to state court. This motion is based on this notice of motion and motion, the memorandum or points and authorities in support thereof, the pleadings and records on file in this case and other such matters and argument as the Court may consider in the hearing of this motion.

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#### STATEMENT OF ISSUES TO BE DECIDED

- 1. Whether this Court lacks jurisdiction over this action where Plaintiff and the putative class are citizens of California, where Safeway is also a citizen of California and where Safeway has failed to meet its burden of proof in removing this action from state court.
- 2. Whether even if this Court possessed jurisdiction pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, the "home-state" nature of the controversy would require the Court to otherwise decline that jurisdiction.
- 3. Whether pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), this Court should exercise its discretion to "require payment of just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of" Safeway's improper removal of this case.

#### MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

Plaintiff Theadora King, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated and in support of Plaintiff's Motion to Remand, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1447 and 1453, hereby states as follows:

## I. INTRODUCTION

On January 11, 2008, Plaintiff Theadora King filed the present class action in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Alameda against Defendant Safeway, Inc. ("Safeway"), seeking relief for the injuries sustained "as a result of Safeway's deceptive marketing of milk as organic when the milk is not, in fact, organic." Class Action Complaint, ¶ 1 ("Complaint" or "Compl."). Notwithstanding the plain language of Plaintiff's Complaint, which seeks certification of a class under California law, consisting *solely of citizens of California*, on February 19, 2008, Safeway removed the present action to this Court, relying on the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 as amended by the Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA") of 2005. *See* Notice of Removal, ¶ 3 (Dkt. No. 1).

However, as will be demonstrated below, this Court lacks jurisdiction over this action where Plaintiff and the putative class are citizens of California, where Safeway is also a citizen of California and where Safeway has failed to meet its burden of proof. Furthermore, even if this Court possessed jurisdiction pursuant to CAFA, the "home-state" nature of the controversy would require the Court to otherwise decline that jurisdiction. As a result, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this matter be remanded to the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Alameda.

#### II. BURDENS OF PROOF AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

While the text of CAFA itself is "silent as to the burden of proof," the Ninth Circuit has "concluded that Congress intended to maintain the historical rule that it is the proponent's burden to establish a prima facie case of removal jurisdiction." *Serrano v. 180 Connect, Inc.*, 478 F.3d 1018, 1021 (9th Cir. 2007). By contrast, to the extent a party argues against removal based on an

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All emphasis added and all internal quotations and citations removed, unless otherwise stated.

exception to CAFA, the burden of proof shifts as "the party seeking remand bears the burden to prove an exception to CAFA's jurisdiction." Serrano, 478 F.3d at 1021-1022.

As observed by the Ninth Circuit in Lowdermilk v. United States Bank Nat'l Assoc., 479 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2007), federal courts "are courts of limited jurisdiction and we will strictly construe our jurisdiction," particularly where "it is well established that the plaintiff is 'master of her complaint' and can plead to avoid federal jurisdiction." *Id.* at 998-99. "Because the Court strictly construes the removal statute against removal, if there is *any doubt* as to the existence of federal jurisdiction, the Court should remand the matter to state court." Harrington v. Mattel, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 95401, at \*6 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2007). "This burden generally remains the same under CAFA." Id.

#### III. **ARGUMENT**

#### Safeway Has Not Met Its Burden of Proving That CAFA Provides this Court with Α. **Jurisdiction over this Class Action**

Pursuant to CAFA, this Court has original jurisdiction over this class action so long as "the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of \$5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is a class action in which ... any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any defendant." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A). However, where Plaintiff and the putative class are all citizens of California and where Safeway is also a citizen of California, minimal diversity is absent, notwithstanding the fact of Safeway's Delaware incorporation. As a result, this Court does not have original jurisdiction over this putative class action and must remand.

#### 1. The Putative Class Consists Solely of California Citizens

In arguing that jurisdiction exists in this matter, Safeway first suggests minimal diversity exists because "Plaintiff's class definition does not restrict the class to California citizens." Notice of Removal, ¶ 4. However, Plaintiff's Complaint clearly limits the putative class to citizens of California. In Paragraph 33, Plaintiff draws a class definition which limits this action to a statewide class of Californians:

> Plaintiff seeks certification of a state-wide Consumer Class defined as follows:

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All persons in the State of California who purchased organic milk or milk products from Safeway during the time period of December 5, 2003 through October 15, 2007.

Compl., ¶ 33. In addition, near the outset of Plaintiff's Complaint, Plaintiff notes that: "[t]his litigation may not be removed to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 as amended by the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, because *the members of the Plaintiff Class are citizens of the same state, California, as Defendant*." Compl., ¶ 8 (emphasis added). As a consequence, and Safeway's myopic reading of Plaintiff's Complaint aside, this explicit disclaimer sufficiently demonstrates that the putative class is limited to "citizens" of California.

Notably, in *Roche v. Country Mut. Ins. Co.*, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 48921, at \*1 (S.D. Ill. July 6, 2007), a district court addressed a similar situation as that before this Court. In *Roche*, an Illinois plaintiff brought a class action against an Illinois insurance company regarding medical billing practices. *Id.* In examining the sufficiency of the plaintiff's complaint, the court noted that "the class is drawn to include only 'licensed healthcare providers in Illinois' ... and the complaint specifically disclaim[ed] the existence of diversity jurisdiction under CAFA on the grounds that 'the proposed class consists only of medical providers within Illinois.'" *Id.* at \*9 n.6. The court concluded "that Roche's allegations sufficiently restrict[ed] the proposed class to Illinois citizens," adding that "even were there a dispute as to whether the class includes non-Illinois citizens, Country, which, as noted, has the burden of proof in this instance, has not produced any evidence of this." *Id.* at \*10.

While the removing defendant did not dispute that the plaintiff limited her class to Illinois citizens, such a concession is not surprising given the express disclaimer regarding the scope of the

15. Safeway has presented no such record evidence. See infra Section III.A.1.

from nearly forty different states purchased [the product at issue from defendant] in Iowa.

including "evidence that ... out-of-state corporations purchased from Pioneer in Iowa." Id. at \*13-

While Safeway contends that "substantially identical class definitions" are found in *McMorris v. TJX Cos.*, 493 F. Supp. 2d 158 (D. Mass. 2007) and *Larsen v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc.*, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 83505, at \*1 (S.D. Iowa Nov. 9, 2007), this is not true. In relevant part, the McMorris class definition was drawn to include "Residents of Massachusetts," *see McMorris*, 493 F. Supp. 2d at 160, while the *Larsen* class definition involved "All persons *and entities* in the state of Iowa." *Larsen*, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 83505, at \*12 (emphasis added). Additionally, the *Larsen* case is distinguishable where the court found that the defendant met its burden of proof having presented "testimony and evidence of its records that persons with out-of-state addresses

putative class found in the plaintiff's complaint, and the court's observation that it "must resolve doubts against removal ... in the light most favorable to [the plaintiff]." *Id.* at \*9; *see also In re FedEx Ground Package Sys.*, 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 1218, at \*23-25 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 13, 2006) (granting plaintiffs' motion to remand in a case against a defendant with its principal place of business in Pennsylvania, where "[t]he complaint identifies the putative class action as containing only those who, at the time of the filing, were (or are) Pennsylvania citizens," and agreeing with the plaintiffs' reasoning "that there can be no minimal diversity (and thus no original jurisdiction)" under such facts).

Significantly, the *Roche* court found the plaintiff sufficiently limited the class to Illinois citizens where the plaintiff's complaint limited the class to "licensed healthcare providers in Illinois" and where "the proposed class consist[ed] only of medical providers within Illinois." *Roche*, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 48921, at \*9. Notably, the language in Plaintiff's Complaint before this Court is stronger and more specific as to the citizenship of the class, where the class definition has been explicitly limited to California citizens: "the members of the Plaintiff Class are citizens of the same state, California, as Defendant." Compl., ¶ 8 (emphasis added); see also FedEx, 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 1218, at \*24 ("The explicit requirements found in § 1332(d)(2) necessitate a showing that at least one member of the putative class action is of diverse citizenship. In trying to make such a showing, FedEx submits three affidavits identifying people who arguably were not citizens of Pennsylvania at the time the complaint was filed. This is not an adequate showing of a diverse member of the putative class; anyone not a citizen of Pennsylvania at the time of the complaint would not be member of the putative class.").

Finally, like the defendant's failure in *Roche* to produce evidence that out-of-state citizens were members of the class, Safeway has produced no evidence that non-California citizens are "persons in the State of California who purchased organic milk or milk products from Safeway." Compl., ¶ 33; *Roche*, U.S. Dist. Lexis 48921, at \*8 n.6. In the place of proof, Safeway submits conjecture, *i.e.*, that citizens of neighboring states are putative class members as "Safeway has many stores in California which are close to, or encroach upon, the borders of other states." Notice of Removal, ¶ 6. In doing so, Safeway relies on the declaration of one of its employees, Laura A.

Donald, an Assistant Vice President and Assistant Secretary. <i>Id.</i> , Ex. 3, ¶ 1 (Declaration of
Laura A. Donald ("Donald Decl.")). But, while declaring to have knowledge regarding "the
amount and value of Safeway's milk sales" and "the location of Safeway retail stores in
California," <i>Id.</i> at ¶¶ 2-3, Safeway has not demonstrated that Ms. Donald is knowledgeable
regarding the <i>citizenship</i> of Safeway's customers, even though she concludes that "[c]itizens of
other states (e.g., Nevada) purchase milk from these stores." Id. at $\P$ 5. See, e.g., Marks v.
Chicoine, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 65671, at *6 n.2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2007) (denying summary
judgment and recognizing that "[a] declaration is a statement of facts which are personally known
to the person making the declaration" and that "[t]he facts in a declaration must be admissible in
evidence, i.e., evidentiary facts and not conclusions or argument"). And, while Safeway contends
generically that Nevada residents "purchase milk" from Safeway, Plaintiff's Complaint concerns
purchases of not just "milk" but "organic milk." Compl., ¶ 33. This lack of specificity further
demonstrates Safeway's failure to meet its removal burden. Miedema v. Maytag Corp., 450 F.3d
1322 (11th Cir. 2006) (affirming district court's remand of a state law class action involving the
defective manufacture of certain appliances brought on behalf of Florida residents under Florida
law, where a declaration submitted by defendant in support of removal was based on the total
number of appliances sold and where the complaint did not allege that every such appliance sold
during the class period was defective).

Accordingly, the plain language of Plaintiff's Complaint belies any argument that Plaintiff failed to limit the class in this case to citizens of California, particularly where Safeway has not met its burden of establishing a prima facie case of removal jurisdiction.

#### Safeway Cannot Show that At Least One Member of the Class is of Diverse 2. Citizenship

Because the putative class is limited to California citizens, Safeway cannot show that "any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any defendant." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A). As a logical result, where the class consists of California citizens, and where

Safeway is a citizen of California maintaining its principal place of business in California,<sup>3</sup> no members of the class are citizens "of a State different" than Safeway. Thus, minimal diversity under CAFA is absent. *See*, *e.g.*, *Lao* v. *Wickes Furniture Co.*, 455 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1061 (C.D. Cal. 2006) ("For the purpose of diversity jurisdiction, a corporation is a citizen of any state where it is incorporated and of the state where it has its principal place of business. Here, Wickes is incorporated under the laws of the State of Delaware. Thus, to defeat jurisdiction under CAFA it must be established that California is Wickes' principal place of business.") (questioned on other grounds by *Serrano* v. *180 Connect*, *Inc.*, 478 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2007)).

For example, in *Sundy v. Renewable Envtl. Solutions, L.L.C.*, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 75762, at \*1, after determining that the defendant, a Delaware corporation, maintained its principal place of business in Missouri, the court turned to the issue of "whether [the defendant] has demonstrated the minimal diversity required by CAFA." *Id.* at \*10. In doing so, the Court recognized that "[t]his requirement is satisfied if there is at least one member of the class who is not a citizen of either Missouri or Delaware." *Id.* In ruling in favor of the plaintiffs, the court noted that the defendant "failed to sustain their burden of demonstrating there is a member of the class who is neither a citizen of Missouri nor a citizen of Delaware, and have therefore failed to demonstrate federal jurisdiction exists." *Id.* Like the defendant in *Sundy*, Safeway has also failed to demonstrate that federal jurisdiction exists.

Safeway also suggests that minimal diversity exists where Plaintiff is a citizen of California and where Safeway is a citizen of California and Delaware. In doing so, Safeway relies on one selectively quoted decision by the U.S. Supreme Court. Notice of Removal, ¶ 5 (quoting *Grupo* 

Unlike defendants in other cases, see, e.g., Sundy v. Renewable Envtl. Solutions, L.L.C.,

2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 75762, at \*1 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 10, 2007), Safeway concedes that it maintains its principal place of business in California and is thus a citizen of California. *See* Notice of

Removal, ¶ 5 ("Safeway is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in the State

§ 1332(c)(1)). In light of this concession, it is also evident that Safeway cannot demonstrate the existence of complete diversity necessary under non-CAFA based diversity jurisdiction. See, e.g.,

China Basin Props., Ltd. v. One Pass, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 1038, 1041 (N.D. Cal. 1993) ("One Pass is a citizen of both California and Delaware for diversity purposes. Because Plaintiff is also a

citizen of California, the parties lack complete diversity and the Court is without jurisdiction to

of California and thus, is a dual citizen of Delaware and California.") (citing 28 U.S.C.

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hear Plaintiff's claims against One Pass.").

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Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 578 n.6 (2004)). However, Grupo is of no assistance to Safeway where the Court commented on the issue of minimal diversity as dicta, did so contrary to existing precedent and without citation to supporting authority.

As selectively quoted by Safeway, the Court in *Grupo* addressed "minimal diversity" as follows:

> We understand "minimal diversity" to mean the existence of at least one party who is diverse in citizenship from one party on the other side of the case, even though the extraconstitutional "complete" diversity" required by our cases is lacking. It is possible, though far from clear, that one can have opposing parties in a two-party case who are cocitizens, and yet have minimal Article III jurisdiction because of the multiple citizenship of one of the parties.

*Grupo*, 541 U.S. at 578 n.6 (emphasizing language from *Grupo* excluded by Safeway). In addition to omitting the language "though far from clear" in quoting Grupo to this Court, Safeway excluded another sentence which immediately followed the above quotation, in which the Court attempted to distinguish contrary precedent: "Although the Court has previously said that minimal diversity requires 'two adverse parties [who] are not co-citizens,' the Court did not have before it a multiplecitizenship situation." Id. (quoting State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 531 (1967)). But see State Farm, 386 U.S. at 531 ("[T]his Court and the lower courts have concluded that Article III poses no obstacle to the legislative extension of federal jurisdiction, founded on diversity, so long as any two adverse parties are not co-citizens."). Compare id. (construing the federal interpleader statute) with Hart v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 457 F.3d 675, 676-677 (7th Cir. 2006) ("For many years, it has permitted minimal diversity suits under the federal interpleader statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1335. In 2005, it did the same thing for large class actions, when it enacted CAFA.").

Of the three courts<sup>4</sup> quoting the *Grupo* footnote's reference to minimal diversity in the context of CAFA, only the Sundy court has analyzed its applicability to CAFA with respect to a

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removing defendant's citizenship. <sup>5</sup> Indeed, in <i>Sundy</i> , the court explicitly declined "to adopt
Defendants' formulation as a correct statement of law" where defendant "suggest[ed] that minimal
diversity exists unless a member of the class is a citizen of both Missouri and Delaware" in an
action filed in Missouri by Missouri citizens against a Delaware corporation doing business in
Missouri. Sundy, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 75762, at *11 n.4. And, in doing so, the court also rejected
outright the defendant's reliance "on dicta from the Supreme Court's opinion in <i>Grupo Dataflux v</i> .
Atlas Global Group, L.P. [where,] in addition to being dicta, that passage acknowledged this
proposition was 'possible, though far from clear,' did not reference any supporting authority, and
noted the existence of contrary authority." <i>Id</i> .

Accordingly, because minimal diversity (and complete diversity) is absent in this case, this Court must remand this matter to the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Alameda.

# B. Even If CAFA Provides this Court with Jurisdiction, the Home-State Controversy Exception Requires this Court to Decline Its Jurisdiction

Even if this Court found that it has jurisdiction over this class action pursuant to CAFA, this Court must decline its jurisdiction because of the "home-state controversy" exception since more than two-thirds of the class members are from California and Safeway is also from California. As explained by the Ninth Circuit:

Section 1332(d)(4)(B) sets forth what has been dubbed the 'homestate controversy' exception:

A district court *shall decline to exercise jurisdiction* under [§ 1332(d)(2)]...(B) where two-thirds or more of the members of all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate and the primary defendants, are citizens of the State in which the action was originally filed.

Serrano, 478 F.3d at 1022-23 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(B)). To start, because Plaintiff has named only one Defendant, there can be no doubt that that Safeway is a "primary defendant" in

two states in which TJX is domiciled").

The only other court to come close to analyzing the *Grupo* issue did not directly decide the issue. *See McMorris*, 493 F. Supp. 2d at 163-64 (observing that "[t]he Supreme Court recently noted that minimal diversity may well be satisfied in any situation where one of the parties has multiple citizenship," but observing the issue to be "left open" and ultimately not dispositive to the court's ruling where the defendant "sufficiently alleged a 'reasonable probability' that at least one member of the McMorris class is domiciled in a state other than Massachusetts or Delaware, the

this case. Likewise, there can be no doubt that this matter was originally filed in California and that Safeway is a citizen of California, maintaining its principal place of business within the state.

To the extent that a dispute exists, it only exists as to the issue of whether "two-thirds or more of the members of all proposed plaintiff classes" are citizens of California. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(B). However, this too is a non-issue because the membership of the proposed plaintiff class is limited to citizens of California. See supra Section III.A.1. Thus, where this matter was filed in California under California law, where all "of the members of all proposed plaintiff classes" are citizens of California and where Safeway, the only and therefore primary defendant, is also a citizen of California, this Court must decline its jurisdiction.

## C. Federal Question Jurisdiction Also Does Not Exist

In addition, because Plaintiff's Complaint seeks relief solely under California law, no questions of federal law are implicated. *See* Compl., ¶¶ 40-72. While Safeway submits in a footnote that "alternate grounds for removal may exist, namely federal question jurisdiction based on principles of complete preemption," it has only reserved "the right to raise issues of complete preemption...in support of a motion to dismiss at the appropriate time." Notice of Removal, ¶ 3 n1. As a result, Safeway has waived such arguments as a ground for removal (or at a minimum has a failed to carry its burden of proving its applicability). Nevertheless, even if this Court found that Safeway did not waive the ability to raise the issue on removal, the Ninth Circuit has ruled that a defense of complete preemption is insufficient to invoke federal question jurisdiction. *See*, *e.g.*, *Balcorta v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp.*, 208 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000) ("[T]he 'complete preemption' doctrine does not abrogate the standard rule that a defense of preemption

As previously noted, Safeway argues that it "has many stores in California which are close

to, or encroach upon the borders of other states," to conclude that "[c]itizens of other states, (e.g.,

Nevada) purchase milk from these stores." Notice of Removal, Ex. 3, ¶ 5 (Donald Decl.). During the class period, California's population far surpassed the combined population of its neighboring

California during the class period, compared with 2,495,529 in Nevada, 6,166,318 in Arizona and

population (48,820,154), California's population comprises approximately 74.7% of the total. While the focus of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(B) is on citizenship rather than population, this figure is

3,700,758 in Oregon during the same time period. *See* U.S. Census Bureau, State & County Quick Facts http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/index.html (last visited Feb. 29, 2008). Of the combined

states. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, 36,457,549 people were estimated to live in

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nevertheless illustrative that the requirement that two-thirds of the class be citizens of California is

met in this case.

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does not create federal question jurisdiction."). Accordingly, federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is also absent.

# D. In Remanding, This Court Should Also Award "Just" Costs and Expenses, Including Reasonable Attorneys' Fees

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), this Court "may require payment of just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of" Safeway's improper removal of this case. *See id.*; *Gotro v. R & B Realty Group*, 69 F.3d 1485, 1487-88 (9th Cir. 1995). This Court may award attorneys' fees when defendant's removal is wrong as a matter of law. *Balcorta*, 208 F.3d at 1106 n.6 (affirming fee award based on district court's correct decision to remand); *Moore v. Permanente Med. Group*, 981 F.2d 443, 448 (9th Cir. 1992) (indicating that bad faith need not be demonstrated to award fees).

In numerous other cases, courts have awarded such attorneys fees. *See*, *e.g.*, *Gibson v. Chrysler Corp.*, 261 F.3d 927, 932, 950 (9th Cir. 2001) (\$28,650); *Ansley v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co.*, 194 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1065 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (\$3,600), *aff'd*, 340 F.3d 858 (9th Cir. 2003); *Braco v. MCI Worldcom Commc'ns.*, *Inc.*, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1270 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (\$7,500); *accord Schorsch v. Hewlett-Packard Co.*, 417 F.3d 748, 751-52 (7th Cir. 2005) ("Defendants should recognize that 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) makes an award of attorneys' fees the norm for improper removal.... [W]e invite the plaintiffs to file (in the district court) an appropriate request for reimbursement of the additional legal expenses to which they have been put by HP's efforts to move this litigation from state to federal court."). Accordingly, Plaintiff requests this Court grant just attorneys' fees and expenses incurred in litigating Plaintiff's Motion to Remand.

#### IV. CONCLUSION

Simply put, in a case brought by a California citizen under California law, against a company that is California citizen and limited to California citizens, Safeway cannot demonstrate that this case belongs in federal court. Accordingly for the reasons provided above and in her //

1	Motion to Remand, Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court to remand this matter to the Superior		
2	Court for the State of California, County of Alameda, grant an award of reasonable attorneys' fees		
3	and costs, and grant all such other relief as this Court deems necessary and appropriate.		
4			
5	Dated: March 5, 2008	Respectfully submitted	
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## **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that on March 5, 2008 I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the e-mail addresses registered, as denoted on the attached Electronic Mail Notice List, and I hereby certify that I have mailed the foregoing document or paper via the United States Postal Service to the non-CM/ECF participants indicated on the attached Manual Notice List.

/s/ Shana E. Scarlett
SHANA E. SCARLETT

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# Mailing Information for a Case 3:08-cv-00999-EDL

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